

The Russia–Ukraine Conflict and Its Impact on Indonesia Energy and Food Economy in 2022

Dharma Feriawan* & Ali Maksum

Program Studi Magister Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Pascasarjana,
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

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*Corresponding Email: d.feriawan.psc22@mail.umy.ac.id

Abstract

This study examines how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has affected Indonesia's rising costs for wheat, fertilizer, and oil. The study looks at how domestic policy responses are influenced by global disruptions using a political-economics framework. With an emphasis on oil, wheat, and fertilizer imports, financial statistics and trade data between Russia, Ukraine, and Indonesia were gathered in 2021–2022. Descriptive qualitative approaches, data-gathering techniques, and data-analysis procedures are used in the analysis. According to the findings, the war caused a great deal of instability in the world's oil distribution, which raised Indonesian commodities prices and had a domino impact on the country's food supply chains. The conflict also impacted Indonesia's access to fertilizer raw materials from Russia, the cost of importing oil from Russia, and the purchase of wheat from Ukraine. As a result, fertilizer prices significantly increased, which in turn led necessities like wheat to rise. Overall, the study improves knowledge of how geopolitical conflicts directly affect Indonesia's economic stability through supply vulnerabilities and price escalation, and it emphasizes the need of strategic policy responses to handle external influences.

Keywords: Indonesia; Political Economy; Impact of War; Russian-Ukrainian War

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INTRODUCTION

Bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine have been marked by long-standing historical, political, and geopolitical complexities that continue to shape contemporary conflicts. Ukraine's integration into the Soviet Union and its subsequent independence in 1991 did not eliminate structural tensions with Russia, as divergent political orientations and security interests continued to persist (Alisa 2022). These unresolved dynamics became more visible after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which triggered armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and fundamentally altered the regional security landscape.

Since then, the Russia–Ukraine conflict has evolved through a series of military escalations and diplomatic efforts that reflect deeper strategic rivalries rather than isolated incidents. Events such as the seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait, troop deployments near Ukraine's borders, and repeated violations of ceasefire agreements illustrate the fragility of existing peace initiatives, including the Minsk negotiations and subsequent discussions within the Trilateral Contact Group (CNBC 2022; Isachencov and Karmanau 2019). These developments indicate that diplomatic mechanisms have struggled to address the core issues driving the conflict.

The intensification of military activities from 2020 onward, including Russia's large-scale troop mobilizations and Ukraine's increasing security concerns, signaled a shift from a localized conflict to a broader confrontation with international implications. Despite calls for dialogue and negotiation, hostilities escalated significantly in early 2022, culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent occupation of strategic territories such as Kherson (Alisa 2022; CNBC 2022). This escalation prompted widespread international responses, particularly in the form of economic sanctions aimed at constraining Russia's military and political actions (Zulfa, Arisanto, and Mahadana 2022).

Rather than merely constituting a sequence of historical events, the Russia–Ukraine conflict constitutes a critical case for examining how power politics, security dilemmas, and international responses interact in contemporary geopolitics. Therefore, understanding this conflict requires not only a chronological overview but also an analytical framework that explains why diplomatic efforts have repeatedly failed and how military escalation and economic sanctions shape the behavior of the actors involved (CNBC 2022). This study positions the Russia–Ukraine conflict as an analytical problem, focusing on the underlying dynamics that sustain the prolonged confrontation between the two countries.

The protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine has generated significant global concern, resulting in severe consequences for various economic sectors, particularly the mining, oil, and gas subsectors, which are highly vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations and market dynamics (Kennedy, 2023). The war has driven substantial increases in the prices of key commodity prices, with coal rising by 60%, European natural gas by more than 30%, and wheat by over 40%. The UK and US embargo on Russian oil imports in early March 2022 also led to a surge in Brent crude oil prices to \$130 per barrel (Kennedy, 2023). The impacts of this conflict are not limited to developed countries; developing nations such as Bangladesh, which rely heavily on petroleum imports and partially on certain food grains like wheat from Russia and Ukraine, have also been affected (Sakib, 2023; Mazumder, 2023). In Southeast Asia, high dependence on imported energy and food has directly affected regional economies, including increases in fuel and food costs (Bakrie, Delanova, & Mochamad Yani, 2022; Yudianto & Supriyadi, 2023; Yuniarto et al., 2023).

In February 2022, global attention focused sharply on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which stemmed from heightened geopolitical tensions. The Russian government launched a military operation in Ukraine, signaling strong opposition to NATO expansion and Ukraine's aspiration to align with the West (Cifuentes-Faura, 2022; Shah et al., 2022). In response, several countries, including the United States and European nations, imposed economic sanctions on Russia, which significantly impacted its economy, with projected GDP contractions ranging from -12.5% to -16.5% in 2022 (Khudaykulova, Yuanqiong, & Khudaykulov, 2022). The prolonged war has caused serious humanitarian and economic consequences, affecting global supply chains, oil and gas



prices, financial system stability, economic growth, stock markets, inflation, and the cost of living (Al-Saadi, 2023).

The conflict has also had a direct impact on global oil markets, triggering the "shorting effect," in which prices rise due to supply disruptions or increased demand (DANO, 2022; Hakim & Sadiyin, 2022). Indonesia, heavily reliant on global trade, is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices of essential commodities such as food and fuel. Russia and Ukraine are key actors in global markets for oil, gas, metals, minerals, grain, and fertilizer. Russia, as of 2021, ranks third in global oil production, accounting for over 12% of total world output, and is the second-largest natural gas producer, with reserves surpassing 38 trillion m³ (Asmarini, 2022; Lossan, 2020). The country also ranks third in coal production, providing about 15% of global supply (CNN Indonesia, 2022). Ukraine, meanwhile, serves as a significant wheat supplier for Indonesia, providing 25.5% of the country's total grain imports by 2022, second only to Australia. Additionally, Russia is a major supplier of fertilizers such as NPK, affecting Indonesia's domestic fertilizer supply and subsidy programs (Damiana, 2023; Sucahyo, 2023). Furthermore, global sanctions against Russia have disrupted trade in metals, imposing additional tariffs and bans that have ripple effects on Indonesia's imports of iron, steel, and related products (Purwanti, 2022). These trade linkages and price oscillations underscore the interconnectedness of Indonesia with global commodity markets and the importance of government policies to mitigate domestic economic vulnerabilities.

In this context, International Political Economy (IPE) theory provides a conceptual framework to understand the interactions between the market, the state, and society under global pressures. IPE emphasizes the close relationship between politics and economics, where politics involves struggles for power and influence, while economics concerns the pursuit of wealth and resources (Jackson & Sorensen, 1999; Gilpin, 2011; Oatley, 2011). From the IPE perspective, dominant and less powerful actors interact within global markets, influencing international trade, monetary systems, multinational corporation activities, and economic development policies (Oatley, 2011; Balaam & Dillman, 2014). Moreover, IPE highlights dynamics of power, national interests, and economic dependence, which can serve as sources of tension, as illustrated by Gilpin (2016) in the context of conflict and war.

However, these theories have not been fully operationalized empirically within the Indonesian context, leaving it unclear how concepts such as the state, market, power, and national interest can be applied to analyze trade data, energy and food prices, and government policy responses. Addressing this gap, this study integrates International Political Economy (IPE) concepts in a descriptive analytical manner to examine the economic impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on Indonesia. Specifically, the study investigates how the conflict has affected price dynamics and trade volumes of Indonesia's energy and food commodities during the 2021-2022 period, how changes in supply and Indonesia's level of dependence on strategic commodities such as oil, wheat, and fertilizers have emerged as a result of global market disruptions, and how the Indonesian government has responded through policy measures to manage rising prices and supply constraints in the energy and food sectors triggered by the war.

RESEARCH METHOD

The study uses three research methods: descriptive qualitative analysis, data collection techniques, and data analysis methodologies. The research applies a descriptive qualitative approach, aiming to provide a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon through a detailed examination of secondary data. The approach is designed not merely to summarize data, but to interpret and explain the relationships between Indonesia's domestic economic responses and global market dynamics. The analytical strategy follows three procedural steps: first, identifying relevant variables and indicators in the energy and food sectors; second, organizing data according to temporal and sectoral relevance (e.g., price fluctuations, import volumes, government interventions); and third, interpreting these patterns through the lens of IPE, focusing



on interactions between state policies, market forces, and international dependencies. This ensures that the qualitative approach is analytically grounded rather than purely descriptive in nature (Metha Jaya, 2020).

The data collection techniques used in this study are web research and library research, such as collecting data via the annual trade statistics website www.trademap.org, collecting rupiah exchange rate data via www.satudata.kemendag.go.id, news related to the government policy from www.idih.pertanian.go.id, news through trusted media such as www.cnbcindonesia.com, www.bbc.com, www.tempo.co, www.nasional.kompas.com, www.kompasiana.com, www.ekonomibisnis.com, www.newsdetik.com, www.pbs.org, and www.mediaindonesia.com.

Data selection criteria included relevance to Indonesia’s energy and food markets, temporal coverage (2021–2022 to capture pre- and post-conflict impacts), credibility of sources, and comprehensiveness of information. This structured selection ensures the analysis is based on representative and verifiable data.

Data analysis involved a systematic process combining quantitative data visualization and qualitative interpretation:

- Microsoft Excel was used to organize, process, and visualize trade data, commodity prices, and government policy actions through charts and graphs.
- Patterns of price fluctuations, trade volume changes, and policy interventions were then interpreted within the IPE framework, examining how market forces, state policies, and international economic dependencies interact to shape Indonesia’s domestic outcomes.

This approach allows for the identification of direct and indirect impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Indonesia, while linking descriptive findings to theoretical concepts such as state-market interaction, power asymmetries, and global economic interdependence. By integrating the qualitative analysis with IPE, the study moves beyond technical data reporting, establishing a robust foundation for understanding the systemic effects of global conflicts on domestic economic resilience.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Economic Impact

To provide background for this topic, the researcher examines a graph of the dollar's exchange rate against the rupiah, which serves as the foundation for international trade. It's important to remember that these data change every year. As a result, the average value of the data is calculated for each year from 2021 to 2022. The goal of this method is to improve understanding of currency exchange rate variations over a specified period while also simplifying the evaluation of their impact on the economic issues under consideration.




Figure 1: Dollar to Rupiah exchange rate
Source 1: satudata.kemendag

However, there are notable changes in the graph displaying the Dollar's exchange rate against the Rupiah from 2021 to 2022. In 2021, the average exchange rate for the Indonesian rupiah was IDR 14,345. The rate then increased to Rp 14,917 in 2022. Changes in the dollar's exchange rate against the Rupiah have a substantial impact on trade. A depreciating currency rate might stimulate exports as Indonesian products become more affordable in the international market. In contrast, increasing the value of the Rupiah may encourage imports because it allows for the purchase of products and services from overseas sources at a lower cost. This approach provides an early indication of the complexities of Indonesia's economic situation during that period.




Figure 2: Russia semi-finished petroleum exports to Indonesia
Source 2: Trademap

In 2021, Russia shipped 104,868 tons of semi-finished petroleum to Indonesia, for IDR 6,136,683 per ton. Nonetheless, in 2022, trade between the nations involved in the conflict declined sharply, eventually reaching zero. This shows a significant shift in trade dynamics, particularly in the allocation of energy resources, which is now geared towards domestic interests, particularly in Russia.




Figure 3: Ukraine wheat exports to Indonesia
Source 3: Trademap




Figure 4: Russia wheat exports to Indonesia
Source 4: Trademap

Wheat trade statistics between Russia, Ukraine, and Indonesia reveal noticeable fluctuations from 2021 to 2022. In 2021, Ukraine exported 3,074,907 tons of wheat to Indonesia, for IDR 4,289,264 per ton. Meanwhile, Russia sent 2,955 tons of wheat to Indonesia, at IDR 4,004,926 per ton. Ukrainian wheat supplies to Indonesia fell significantly by 2022, to 166,758 tons per year. Wheat prices also rose significantly, reaching Rp. 5,486,149 per ton. Furthermore, Russian wheat shipments ceased entirely. The data presented clearly shows the direct influence of the Russia-Ukraine crisis on Indonesia, particularly in terms of commodity pricing, supply volumes, and the prioritization of domestic food fulfilment in both countries. According to the FAO's 2006 perspective, food security consists of four main aspects: food availability, food access, usage, and stability. The concept of food security originated during the 1974 world food summit. "Availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices" (Rohmaniyah, 2020).




Figure 5: Russia exports Phosphorus & Potassium to Indonesia
Source 5: Trademap

In addition, there were changes in the trade sector for fertiliser raw materials from Russia, notably *Potassium* (blue) and *Phosphorus* (orange) for the food industry. Potassium exports in 2021 were 220,288 tonnes per year, priced at Rp. 6,011,388 per tonne. Meanwhile, *Phosphorus* exports were 13,886 tonnes per year, with a value of Rp. 4,028,891 per tonne. In 2022, *Potassium* exports will be significantly lower than the previous year, at 107,490 tonnes per year. However, there will be a significant price increase, with IDR 10,022,629 per tonne. Similarly, *Phosphorus* will drop in quantity, with 187 tonnes per year and a value of Rp. 6,620,803 per tonne. In terms of the subject matter, it can be stated that the quantity and value were within predicted limits in 2021. However, with the commencement of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, costs rose significantly, and there was a risk of delays in the shipment of fertiliser raw materials as a result of the war. In order to control the significant variations in volume and value within the fertiliser raw material market, Indonesia must develop laws to address this major issue as well as any potential future concerns that may arise if the war continues. This approach focuses primarily on shifting supply sources, increasing local production and innovation, and implementing domestic fertiliser subsidies to minimise the effects of these changes on the agriculture sector.

Indonesian Government Policy

As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine escalated, its repercussions on the global economy became increasingly apparent, particularly for Indonesia. Rising world oil prices have imposed significant economic pressure on the country, which heavily relies on oil imports to meet domestic demand. The construction sector has been affected by the rising cost of iron, while the agricultural sector has faced direct challenges due to increased fertilizer and wheat prices. In response, the Indonesian government has taken proactive measures to mitigate these impacts, aiming to reduce inflationary pressures and maintain macroeconomic stability amid global uncertainty (Al-Saadi, 2023; Hakim & Sadiyin, 2022; Kennedy, 2023). These measures demonstrate the government's awareness of the structural vulnerabilities created by global market dependence and the need for targeted interventions to protect critical economic sectors. Furthermore, government policy has been strategically focused on both short-term relief and long-term resilience. Initiatives such as increasing fuel subsidies, regulating the distribution of subsidized fertilizers, and promoting domestic alternatives to imported wheat reflect a deliberate attempt to manage exposure to external shocks while supporting domestic production. By implementing these policies, Indonesia seeks to balance market dynamics with state intervention, illustrating the practical application of International Political Economy (IPE) principles at the national level. This approach not only safeguards immediate economic stability but also strengthens the country's ability to withstand future global disruptions (Bakrie et al., 2022; Damiana, 2023; Sucahyo, 2022).

Government Policy Regarding Increased Oil Prices

To investigate variances in fuel oil (BBM) costs, the author selected a sample of the most recent annual price increase. The increase in gasoline costs observed between 2021 and 2022 affects a variety of fuel categories, including diesel, pertalite, and pertamax. The impact of the price increase can be explained in the following thorough way:




Figure 6: History of fuel increase in 2021-2022

Source 6: nasional.kompas, dataindonesia

In response to the economic challenges posed by rising international oil prices, the Indonesian government has significantly increased the allocation for fuel subsidies, reflecting a proactive and strategic approach. Initially, the fuel subsidy budget was set at IDR 152 trillion in the 2022 state budget; however, through Presidential Decree No. 98 of 2022, it was raised to IDR 502.4 trillion. This 3.4-fold increase demonstrates the government's commitment to mitigating the impacts of volatile global oil markets while ensuring economic stability for households and businesses (Rusia et al., 2023). The adjustment of the subsidy reflects not only a reaction to immediate price shocks but also an effort to prevent inflationary pressures from spreading across other sectors of the economy, including transportation, logistics, and manufacturing.

Government Policy on Rising Energy and Food Prices

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has generated significant disruptions in global energy markets, with direct consequences for Indonesia's economy as a country that is highly dependent on imported oil and gas. The escalation of the conflict in 2022 triggered sharp increases in global oil prices due to supply uncertainty, sanctions on Russian exports, and market speculation, which in led to higher domestic fuel prices in Indonesia. Rising fuel costs affected key economic sectors, including transportation, construction, and manufacturing, increasing production costs and inflationary pressures (Al-Saadi, 2023; DANO, 2022). Trade data and price trends presented in this study indicate that these external shocks translated rapidly into domestic economic vulnerability, illustrating Indonesia's exposure to global commodity volatility. In response, the Indonesian government increased the fuel subsidy budget from IDR 152 trillion to IDR 502.4 trillion through Presidential Decree No. 98 of 2022 (Rusia et al., 2023). From an international political economy perspective, this policy reflects state intervention aimed at stabilizing domestic markets and preserving purchasing power amid external market disruptions, demonstrating how the state actively mediates the transmission of global shocks to the domestic economy.

Beyond the energy sector, rising global oil prices also affected Indonesia's agricultural sector through higher fertilizer costs, given the strong link between energy prices and fertilizer production. Russia's role as a major global supplier of fertilizer raw materials, including potassium and phosphorus, meant that supply disruptions and trade restrictions during the conflict directly influenced global fertilizer prices. Trade data in this study show a sharp decline in fertilizer import

volumes from Russia in 2022, accompanied by significant price increases, which placed pressure on domestic agricultural production. As energy prices rose, the costs of key fertilizer inputs such as Urea and NPK also increased, exacerbating risks to food production and farmer welfare (Gideon, 2022; Sucahyo, 2023). These developments highlight how global energy shocks can cascade across sectors, reinforcing structural vulnerabilities in food systems that depend on imported inputs. The fertilizer crisis thus represents not merely a market fluctuation, but a manifestation of Indonesia's dependence on global supply chains shaped by geopolitical conflict.

To mitigate the impact of rising fertilizer prices and supply constraints, the Indonesian government implemented regulatory measures through Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 10 of 2022, which governs allocation mechanisms and maximum retail prices for subsidized fertilizers (Kementerian Pertanian Republik Indonesia, 2022). The allocation of IDR 25.8 trillion in fertilizer subsidies for approximately 16 million farmers illustrates the state's role as a market regulator seeking to buffer global price volatility and maintain domestic food production stability (Gideon, 2022). From an international political economy perspective, this intervention demonstrates the causal relationship between international conflict, global supply disruptions, and domestic policy responses. Rather than allowing market forces alone to determine outcomes, the state employed both fiscal and regulatory instruments to manage structural dependence on external suppliers. This approach underscores how domestic agricultural policy is deeply embedded within the global political economy, where external shocks necessitate active state involvement to prevent broader socioeconomic instability.

In addition to energy and fertilizer, the Russia-Ukraine war significantly affected Indonesia's wheat supply, given that Ukraine had been one of Indonesia's major wheat exporters prior to the conflict. Trade data presented in this study show a substantial decline in wheat import volumes from Ukraine in 2022, accompanied by rising prices, reflecting disruptions in global grain markets. This situation heightened Indonesia's vulnerability to food supply instability, as wheat plays a critical role in domestic food consumption patterns (Sucahyo, 2022; Damiana, 2023). As a mitigation strategy, the government promoted food diversification by supporting the development of sorghum as an alternative staple, including initiatives backed by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) in East Nusa Tenggara (Sutrisno, 2022). This policy reflects a proactive state response aimed at reducing long-term import dependence and strengthening domestic production capacity. Overall, Indonesia's policies on fuel, fertilizer, and wheat demonstrate an integrated response linking global market dynamics, international conflict, and domestic policy adjustment. These measures confirm that domestic economic policy cannot be separated from the global political economy context, in which the state acts as a key actor balancing national interests against structural dependencies and volatility in international markets.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates how international geopolitical conflicts generate cascading economic effects on domestic economies, even for countries like Indonesia whose direct trade with the warring nations is relatively limited. Evidence from commodity trade, exchange rates, and global market disruptions indicates that Indonesia's exposure to global energy and food markets creates structural vulnerabilities. Rising fuel prices, fertilizer costs, and disruptions in wheat imports highlight the interdependence between global market dynamics, state policy, and domestic economic stability. From an analytical perspective, the government's responses ranging from expanding fuel subsidies and regulating fertilizer distribution to promoting domestic food diversification can be interpreted as coordinated strategic interventions aimed at reducing Indonesia's structural dependence on international markets. These policies reflect the interaction between state power and market forces in mitigating vulnerabilities created by external shocks. Rather than merely reacting to rising prices, Indonesia's measures represent a deliberate attempt to balance domestic economic resilience with exposure to global commodity volatility. While this study relies on secondary data and public sources, limiting the ability to



establish causal mechanisms with full certainty, the findings provide a foundation for understanding how global geopolitical conflicts shape domestic economic policies and market structures. The results suggest that economic resilience in Indonesia depends not only on short-term interventions but also on long-term structural adjustments, such as diversifying trade partners, strengthening domestic production, and creating more flexible policy instruments. Future research could build on these findings by empirically testing the interactions between global conflict, market power, and state policy, thereby providing a more rigorous theoretical and analytical synthesis.

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